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CORPORATE MIGRATIONS AND TAX TRANSPARENCY AND 
DISCLOSURE 
DIANE M. RING* 
INTRODUCTION 
Migration generally refers to the movement of peoples across borders. But 
the broader look at migration in this conference incorporates the movement of 
business across borders. This expanded concept enables us to better understand 
the complex jurisdictional relationships between and among nations and their 
members. The latter part of the twentieth century, in particular the period from 
the 1980s onward, saw notable growth in business expansion across borders.1 
Such expansion, though certainly not without precedent, was spurred by a 
number of factors including reduced currency and investment restrictions, and 
increased ability to manage global activities through technology and 
communications. 
Twenty plus years into this business globalization, we have also witnessed 
the rise of transparency and disclosure rules and regimes that have dominated 
much of global international tax reform.2 Debates over tax transparency and 
disclosure have permeated public discussions and the advocacy platforms of 
nongovernmental organizations. With regard to corporate taxpayers, the primary 
concern has been the ability of multinationals to pursue various tax structures 
and planning strategies that, though perhaps not constituting evasion, 
nonetheless constitute a form of tax avoidance that is not, or should not be, 
permitted. Accompanying the various substantive law reforms targeting such tax 
 
* Professor of Law and the Dr. Thomas F. Carney Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law 
School. I would like to thank participants in the Sanford E. Sarasohn Conference on Critical Issues 
in Comparative and International Taxation II at St. Louis University School of Law, including 
Allison Christians, David Elkins, Heather Field, Leandra Lederman, Shu-Yi Oei, Henry Ordower, 
Kerry Ryan, and Cristina Trenta for their helpful comments. I would like to thank the Dr. Thomas 
F. Carney ‘47 Gift Fund for its valuable support. 
 1. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 9, 11, 20. 
 2. See, e.g., Diane Ring, Article 26: Exchange of Information, in IBFD, GLOBAL TAX 
TREATY COMMENTARIES §§ 1.2.3, 1.2.5.9, 1.2.5.9.1 (2017) [hereinafter Ring, Article 26]; Diane 
Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN 
PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 497, 497 (Alexander Trepelkov, et al. 
eds., 2015) [hereinafter Ring, Transparency and Disclosure]. 
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avoidance have been a series of transparency and disclosure mechanisms aimed 
at supporting the effort to curtail tax base erosion. 
Among the most prominent examples of such transparency and disclosure 
mechanisms, either enacted or being considered, are: (1) country-by-country 
reporting of tax information (from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (“OECD”) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) 
Project), (2) automatic exchange of tax rulings among jurisdictions, and (3) 
disclosure of beneficial ownership of entities.3 Additional high-profile 
measures, predominantly aimed at the conduct of individual tax evaders, include 
the Common Reporting Standard (“CRS”) for automatic exchange of certain 
financial account information and Intergovernmental Agreements (“IGAs”) 
calling for automatic sharing of certain information by foreign financial 
institutions with the United States.4 These measures come at some cost to 
taxpayers and third parties, which must gather, collate, review, and report the 
data.5 Additionally, taxpayers express concern over the possibility that the newly 
reported data will be made public illegally, or perhaps legally in the future, and 
thus harm their business competitiveness.6 
In this Essay, I suggest that the contemporary focus on transparency and 
disclosure is substantially due to the ease of corporate migration and movement 
across borders. Increased transparency and disclosure are the price for the 
increased business border flexibility. International transactions have always 
been part of the economic picture.7 But to the extent taxpayers and transactions 
were historically domestically focused, tax authorities had more access to 
information and more ability to control all of the relevant tax law. 
 
 3. Ring, Article 26, supra note 2, §§ 1.2.5.7, 1.2.5.10, 1.2.5.14; Ring, Transparency and 
Disclosure, supra note 2, at 497–98. 
 4. Ring, Article 26, supra note 2, §§ 1.2.5.5, 4.4.2.1; Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, 
supra note 2, at 497–98; see also Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 EMORY 
L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5) (on file with author); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-
Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 16, 68) (on file with authors). 
 5. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 353–62 (2015); 
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 331–43 (2014); NAT’L 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 238–48 (2013); Oei, supra note 4, 
at 56, 70; Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 67. 
 6. See, e.g., JASON J. FICHTNER & ADAM N. MICHEL, MERCATUS CTR., COMMENT ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
4 (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Fichtner-Country-by-Country-PIC-v1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3B5T-E9EJ] (“Assembling a new, centralized database of highly sensitive 
corporate financial information increases the vulnerability of proprietary business data. It would 
take just one breach of the system, in any one of the party jurisdictions, for all the information to 
be exposed.”); Margaret Burow, CbC Could Be a ‘Nightmare’ for Corporate Tax Departments, 77 
TAX NOTES INT’L 674, 674–75 (2015). 
 7. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Michael O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J., 1021, 1022–24 (1997); Philip R. West & Amanda P. Varma, 
The Past and Future of the Foreign Tax Credit, TAXES, Mar. 2012, at 27, 27. 
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With the advent of globalization, the information necessary to understand 
and evaluate taxpayers has become harder to secure because more data is outside 
the United States and because tax planning now implicates both domestic and 
foreign tax law. This observation does not justify any specific form of disclosure 
and reporting requirement. It does explain why such reporting has become 
increasingly important in recent years. Moreover, it suggests that the BEPS 
momentum and its focus on certain categories of tax planning are not the core 
drivers for transparency and disclosure developments. Rather, modern business 
migration is the fundamental force underpinning the creation of new reporting 
and disclosure regimes. The regimes’ precise shape and timing are then a 
function of convulsive triggers such as tax leaks and/or financial crises that 
trigger specific moments of reform. 
I.  THE RISE OF BORDER MOBILITY 
The globalization literature generally, as well as analyses of trends in 
finance, currency, and investment specifically, note the impact of “de-
regulation” that began in the late 1970s but gathered momentum in the 1980s 
and continues through to the present.8 This deregulation facilitated the 
movement of capital and investment across borders. A rise in technology, 
including information technology and communication, further eased border 
mobility. It is important to reiterate that there is no claim that cross-border 
commerce was heretofore unknown. Active and extensive commerce reaching 
across Africa, Asia, and Europe occurred certainly by the post-classical period.9 
Yet the changes taking shape in the 1980s contributed to a new level of cross-
border investment and business activity, both in kind and volume. The following 
Sections provide a very brief overview of these developments. 
 
 8. See generally Nicholas A. Ashford, Ralph P. Hall & Kyriakos Pierrakakis, Globalization: 
Technology, Trade Regimes, Capital Flows, and International Economy, in NICHOLAS A. 
ASHFORD & RALPH P. HALL, TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALIZATION, AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: TRANSFORMING THE INDUSTRIAL STATE 183, 185 (2011); Richard O’Brien & 
Alasdair Keith, The Geography of Finance: After the Storm, 2009 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS, ECON. 
& SOC’Y 245, 247–48; Lucio Sarno & Mark P. Taylor, Exchange Controls, International Capital 
Flows and Savins-Investment Correlations in the UK: An Empirical Investigation, 134 
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV [REV. WORLD ECON.] 69, 69 (1998) (Ger.) (“Since the late 
1970s, it has become common among economists to describe the world financial system as 
characterized by perfect capital mobility.”); Oussama Kanaan, Tanzania’s Experience with Trade 
Liberalization, FIN. & DEV., June 2000, at 30, 31, 33; Daisuke Ikemoto, Re-Examining the 
Removal of Exchange Control by the Thatcher Government in 1979, at 3–5 (2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2016/Removal%20of% 
20exchange%20control%20by%20the%20Thatcher%20Government_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB 
E4-QVUV]. 
 9. See, e.g., Peter N. Stearns, GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY 82–84 (2d ed. 2017). 
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A. Currency, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology 
1. Currency and Capital Controls 
From the mid-1980s onward, there has been “a surge in capital flows” 
between developed countries and between developed and developing 
countries.10 Central to such flows has been liberalization of currency and 
exchange controls11 across jurisdictions. For example, in 1979 the United 
Kingdom abolished exchange controls.12 Prior to this decision, the U.K. 
Exchange Control Act of 1947 closely regulated the direct and portfolio 
investment capital transactions of British residents.13 The removal of exchange 
controls in countries such as the United Kingdom and Japan contributed to 
financial globalization and to multinationals’ ability to pursue cross-border 
activities.14 Other countries, from France to Tanzania, liberalized their exchange 
controls during the 1980s as well. In France, currency regulations were gradually 
“dismantled” in the latter part of the 1980s, and within a period of six years were 
gone.15 During the 1980s, Tanzania relaxed some foreign exchange limitations 
as part of a broader effort to reduce trade restrictions.16 
In some countries, liberalization of capital controls became more plausible 
once fixed exchange rates were “abandoned” with the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1973.17 It has been argued that the combination of floating 
exchange rates and information technology and communications developments 
foreshadowed the elimination of capital controls.18 Regardless, the resulting 
 
 10. Eswar Prasad et al., Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some 
Empirical Evidence, in INT’L MONETARY FUND, INDIA’S AND CHINA’S RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH 
REFORM AND GROWTH 201, 201 (Wanda Tseng & David Cowen eds., 2005). 
 11. “Exchange controls are put in place by governments and central banks in order to ban or 
restrict the amount of foreign currency or local currency that can be traded or purchased.” Exchange 
Control, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exchangecontrol.asp 
[https://perma.cc/3EDF-DX2X]. 
 12. Ikemoto, supra note 8, at 1. See generally Richard Davies et al., Evolution of the UK 
Banking System, 50 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 321, 327–28 (2010), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb 100407.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DZ3-FHKV]. 
 13. Ikemoto, supra note 8, at 1. 
 14. Id. at 2; see also ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: 
FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990S, at 7–8 (1994); Rei Masunaga, The Deregulation Process 
of Foreign Exchange Control in Capital Transactions in Post-War Japan 3, 6 (Jan. 1997) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.jcif.or.jp/pdf/9701E.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SKF-KVZE] 
(discussing Japan’s liberalization steps undertaken in the 1980s). 
 15. Francoise Drumetz, France’s Experience of Exchange Controls and Liberalisation, in 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CHINA’S CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 99, 99 (BIS Papers No. 15, 2003). 
 16. Kanaan, supra note 8, at 31. 
 17. The End of the Bretton Woods System (1972–81), INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
https://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm [https://perma.cc/2YMF-2RG7]. 
 18. See Ashford et al., supra note 8, at 185; see also infra Section I.A.3. 
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world, with floating exchange rates and freely moving capital, has contributed 
to globalization and the expansion of multinationals across borders. 
2. Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Liberalization 
Beginning in the late 1980s, both developed and developing economies 
began to experience a significant overall growth in their foreign direct 
investment.19 Although the net effects on countries may have varied,20 the 
liberalization involved a familiar set of changes including: (1) tariff reductions, 
(2) elimination of quotas, and (3) relaxation of restrictions on foreign direct 
investment.21 The precise contours of these changes varied by jurisdiction. For 
example, when Kenya undertook (in the late 1980s) more serious trade reforms 
with some external donor pressure, it shifted from import licenses to tariffs as a 
mechanism for controlling trade and then gradually reduced the tariffs.22 India 
also liberalized import licensing by expanding the list of goods on its Open 
General License list, thereby facilitating imports.23 Additionally, India reduced 
the number of imports over which the government had a monopoly. Between the 
periods 1980-81 and 1986-87, the percentage of imports in this government 
monopoly category decreased from sixty-seven percent to twenty-seven 
percent.24 
3. Technology 
The technology innovations that began to take hold in the 1980s reflected 
the broader rise of the knowledge-based economy and the importance of 
information technology for both industrial production and for movement of 
 
 19. See Table of Foreign Direct Investment: Annual Inward and Outward Flows and Stock, 
1970-2016, UNCTAD, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId= 
96740 [https://perma.cc/2H2L-79N7]. 
 20. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, Trade Liberalization: Why So Much Controversy?, in 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF REFORM 131, 131–32 (2005); 
(“Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s were the origin of a strong expansion in international trade.”); 
S.M. SHAFAEDDIN, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: STRUCTURAL CHANGE OR DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION? 2 (U.N. Conference on Trade & 
Dev., Discussion Paper No. 179, Apr. 2005), http://unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20053_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HYU7-7VTD] (evaluating the impact of “trade liberalization and market-oriented 
economic reform that had started in many developing countries in early 1980s [and that] intensified 
in the 1990s”). 
 21. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, supra note 20, at 134. 
 22. Geoffrey Gertz, Kenya’s Trade Liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s: Policies, Impacts, 
and Implications 3 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, 2008), http://carnegieendowment.org/ 
files/kenya_background.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT7Q-6BFL]. 
 23. Arvind Panagariya, India in the 1980s and 1990s: A Triumph of Reforms 14 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 04/43, 2004), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/ 
wp0443.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY9Y-K263]. 
 24. Id. 
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financial information and assets.25 Technology and globalization have been 
characterized as “mutually reinforcing.”26 Central to this dynamic are the 
following factors: (1) microprocessors, (2) communications, (3) biotech, (4) 
lighter materials, and (5) a shift from physical to intellectual factors of business 
production.27 Market leaders in technology and globalization (including 
businesses improving efficiency, quality, customer service, and response time) 
can force competitors to follow or sacrifice market share.28 For a business 
expanding beyond its initial jurisdiction, developments in information 
technology have brought improvements in business logistics and inventory 
management.29 Moreover, technology allows a broader range of participants to 
pursue globalization.30 Relatedly, technology has also spurred development in 
complex financial instruments, such as derivatives,31 and has made financial 
transactions more efficient and less costly.32 
B. Business Border Mobility 
For purposes of examining the impact on tax enforcement of this post-1970s 
rise in business border-mobility,33 it is important to make two observations. 
First, whether this increased mobility was positive or negative for specific 
countries and actors is a separate question from that of its effects on tax 
enforcement. This Essay makes no claims about the net benefits of liberalization 
in currency, capital controls, trade or investment. Regardless of their impact 
elsewhere, the changes did create new and increased challenges for tax 
enforcement to which governments have responded, as examined below in Part 
II.  
Second, the liberalizations described above34 allowed businesses to pursue 
both commercial and financial movement across borders, with varying degrees 
of substance. Thus, for example, on the commercial side businesses found new 
 
 25. Ashford et al., supra note 8, at 184. 
 26. Raj Aggarwal, Technology and Globalization as Mutual Reinforcers in Business: 
Reorienting Strategic Thinking for the New Millennium, 39 MGMT. INT’L REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 
83, 83 (1999). 
 27. Id. at 86. 
 28. Id. at 90. 
 29. Id. at 92. 
 30. Id. at 93 (“Networked systems are making it easier for technology to cross traditional 
national and organizational boundaries allowing even small and new firms . . . to leap frog and pose 
competitive challenges . . . .”). 
 31. Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 94; see also Edward LiPuma & Benjamin Lee, Financial 
Derivatives and the Rise of Circulation, 34 ECON. & SOC’Y 404, 422 (2005) (noting that prior to 
1973, financial derivatives were “[v]irtually nonexistent”). 
 32. Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 94; see also LiPuma & Lee, supra note 31, at 424. 
 33. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra note 19. 
 34. See supra Section I.A. (discussing liberalizations in the regulation of currency, foreign 
direct investment, and trade law). 
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or broadened import and export markets, new manufacturing locations, and new 
investment opportunities. These activities typically involved real and 
meaningful movements in goods, services, assets, and production. However, the 
liberalizations also facilitated “shifts” across borders whose substance tax 
authorities have been inclined to challenge. These scenarios typically include 
offshore entities: (1) with few functions or employees; (2) inserted in a chain of 
transactions without a clear role; or (3) serving as holding companies for 
intangibles. Recognition of the distinction between real migration and more 
illusory migration helps anticipate the kinds of information needs and 
constraints experienced by home-country tax authorities as they seek to bring 
into focus the picture of contemporary multinational enterprise (“MNE”) 
business models. 
II.  EMERGING TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE REGIMES 
Not only has the latter part of the twentieth century brought increased 
business border flexibility, it has also ushered in a period of increased tax 
transparency and disclosure.35 Part III considers the connection between the two 
trends and the implications for tax policy, but in anticipation of that discussion, 
this Part outlines the basic contours of the contemporary disclosure trend.  
Before the current round of transparency and disclosure mechanisms 
introduced in the past fifteen years and discussed below, there were long-
standing global and domestic tools to facilitate tax authorities’ access to 
information. For example, both the OECD and the U.N. Model Income Tax 
Treaties have historically included an Article 26 detailing procedures for 
exchange of information between tax authorities.36 In reality, the effective scope 
of these Article 26 provisions was often quite limited. Nonetheless, they 
represented a clear recognition that in a world of cross-border business activity 
a tax authority may need assistance from other jurisdictions.37 Additionally, 
individual countries adopted their own domestic reporting requirements 
 
 35. See Ring, Article 26, supra note 2, § 1.2.3; Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 
2, at 499. 
 36. See, e.g., XAVIER OBERSON, INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN TAX 
MATTERS: TOWARDS GLOBAL TRANSPARENCY 14–16 (2015) (“Since its first publication in 1963, 
Art. 26 of the OECD Model still represents the most relevant legal basis for international exchange 
of information.”). 
 37. OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2014 (FULL VERSION), 
at C(26)-1 (2015) (giving commentary on Article 26 of the OECD Model); U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. 
& SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN 
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 435–36 (2011), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/ 
UN_Model_2011_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SNJ-YT7F]. Both models have undergone 
change over their decades of existence, including a variety of more recent changes aimed at 
improving exchange of information (such as the removal of a “bank secrecy” grounds for declining 
to provide information). See, e.g., Ring, Article 26, supra note 2, § 1.1.1. 
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designed to obtain a more complete picture of a multinational’s activities abroad. 
Thus, for example, since the 1960s, the United States has required taxpayers to 
complete Form 5471 (or its predecessors),38 an information return for U.S. 
taxpayers who are shareholders, directors, or officers in certain foreign 
(controlled) corporations.39 Since 1984, a Form 926 must be filed by a U.S. 
transferor upon the transfer or exchange of property to a foreign corporation.40  
However, not all countries had comparable information reporting 
provisions, and even those provisions in the United States were not all-
encompassing. Nor did any of these provisions generate publicly available 
information, or the prospect of it. Against this backdrop, the introduction of 
multiple avenues for tax transparency and disclosure in recent years has attracted 
significant attention and generated momentum for a culture of transparency and 
disclosure. Although the foundation for this trend is the fundamental fact of 
business migration, more episodic events, including a series of leaks regarding 
taxpayer and government conduct, have dictated the precise timing and contours 
of the reforms.41 Thus, this Essay will turn directly to a consideration of key 
exemplars of the new transparency and disclosure trend. 
A. Country-by-Country Reporting 
The OECD’s BEPS Action Plan introduced in 2013 included an agenda item 
to review and reinvigorate transfer pricing documentation as part of Action 13.42 
The Final Report for Action 13 included recommendations for three related 
disclosure obligations to be imposed on larger multinationals: (1) a master file, 
(2) a local file, and (3) a country-by-country (“CbC”) report based on a 
template.43 The master file is expected to provide “standardised information 
relevant for all MNE group members” on topics including organizational 
structure, business descriptions, intangibles held by the group, intercompany 
 
 38. Melissa Redmiles & Jason Wenrich, A History of Controlled Foreign Corporations and 
the Foreign Tax Credit, 27 SOI BULL. 129, 134 & n.7 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/his 
torycfcftc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HUR-UPSR]. 
 39. Id. at 134; About Form 5471, Information Return of U.S. Persons with Respect to Certain 
Foreign Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/uac/form-
5471-information-return-of-u-s-persons-with-respect-to-certain-foreign-corporations 
[https://perma.cc/YUM4-D6PL]. 
 40. Form 926 – Filing Requirement for U.S. Transferors of Property to a Foreign 
Corporation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/individuals/interna 
tional-taxpayers/form-926-filing-requirement-for-us-transferors-of-property-to-a-foreign-corpora 
tion [https://perma.cc/T8QF-P6XE]. 
 41. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 4. 
 42. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 23 (2013), 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BXR-J4VN]. 
 43. OECD, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING, 
ACTION 13 - 2015 FINAL REPORT 15–17 (2015). 
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financial activities, and financial and tax positions of the multinational.44 The 
local file provides jurisdiction-specific information, with a focus on information 
regarding transactions between the MNE’s entity in the local jurisdiction and 
other related parties.45 Information provided includes financial data on the 
transactions, comparability analysis for transfer pricing, and “selection and 
application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method.”46  
But it has been the third component of the Action 13 disclosure package that 
has generated the most interest: CbC reporting. Based on a template provided by 
the OECD BEPS Action 13 Final Report, covered multinationals are expected 
to provide data on the following categories of information: (1) revenue; (2) profit 
(loss) before income tax; (3) cash tax; (4) current year tax accruals; (5) stated 
capital; (6) accumulated earnings; (7) number of employees; and (8) tangible 
assets.47 This data should be provided by the MNE on a country-by-country (not 
entity-by-entity) basis.48  
The two major concerns voiced by taxpayers regarding the data are the level 
of burden in compiling the information (primarily with regard to the CbC report) 
and the roster of potential recipients of the data.49 As regards burden, the OECD 
did reduce the number of CbC reporting categories from a high of seventeen in 
January 2014 and has sought to provide additional guidance on the content of 
the reporting categories.50  
With respect to the question of who will receive the data, the Final Report 
specifies that the MNE parent should make the master file and the local file 
available to their local affiliates, who will in turn make the files available to local 
authorities.51 In contrast, the CbC report should be filed with the tax authorities 
in the jurisdiction of the MNE’s parent. Then, that parent jurisdiction would 
share the CbC report via treaty information exchange mechanisms with the 
jurisdictions in which the MNE has local affiliates. However, the stability of this 
disclosure arrangement is unclear. First, given the value of CbC information, 
some jurisdictions advocated for direct delivery of the report to them by the 
 
 44. Id. at 15–16. 
 45. Id. at 16. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 34–35. 
 48. OECD, supra note 43, at 11. 
 49. See, e.g., C.N. Macfarlane, TEI Seeks Consistency in Proposed U.S. Country-by-Country 
Reporting Regs, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Mar. 21, 2016, LEXIS, 2016 WTD 55-42; Burow, supra 
note 6, at 674. 
 50. Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 2, at 513 n.22 (showing that the reporting 
categories were reduced following feedback on the original OECD draft). 
 51. OECD, supra note 43, at 21; see also Ryan Finley, Lawmaker Urges Limiting Exchange 
of CbC Reports, 81 TAX NOTES INT’L 751, 751 (2016) (noting Vice President of Tax and Domestic 
Economic Policy at the National Association of Manufacturers expressed concern over the direct 
filing of the master report with local tax authorities because the information would not be protected 
by the U.S. Treasury Department’s safeguards in place for the exchange of the CbC reports). 
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multinationals, similar to the delivery plan for the master report and the local 
report.52 Direct delivery bypasses the need for a treaty with the MNE parent 
jurisdiction and the treaty process itself. Second, and explicitly contrary to BEPS 
guidance on the subject, a number of actors in the international community have 
advocated for public disclosure of some or all of the CbC report data—and some 
jurisdictions have considered this option.53 
B. Automatic Exchange of Tax Rulings 
Following the LuxLeaks scandal in 2014, in which information on 
approximately 500 Luxembourg tax rulings regarding 300 multinationals was 
published by the International Consortium of International Journalists 
(“ICIJ”),54 the EU reacted with the introduction of an enhanced disclosure 
mechanism. At the heart of the scandal was the assertion that Luxembourg was 
intentionally using its tax ruling process to help multinationals reduce income 
tax in other jurisdictions (where assets and operations were located) by running 
transactions through Luxembourg.55 These rulings were characterized as 
inappropriately facilitating the MNEs’ worldwide tax avoidance and 
minimization strategies.56 In response, the EU Member States unanimously 
agreed in October 2015 to automatically exchange information on cross-border 
tax rulings every six months.57 The scandal also triggered further investigation 
by the European Parliament and creation of two special committees to 
investigate tax rulings practices (TAXE 1 and TAXE 2).58 In their respective 
reports, the committees identified transparency along with other measures (such 
as substantive law reform) as important tax base protection steps.59 
 
 52. See, e.g., Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 2, at 520. 
 53. See, e.g., William Hoke, The Year in Review: Demands for Greater Tax Transparency 
Escalate in 2016, 85 TAX NOTES INT’L 27, 27–29 (2017) (considering recent developments in 
corporate and individual tax transparency). 
 54. Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 22. The leaked data was initially taken from 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers by its employee, Antoine Deltour. Additional documents were taken by 
a second PwC employee, Raphael Haley, and also delivered to the press. Id. at 22 & n.85. 
 55. Omri Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 1–2; see also Oei & Ring, supra note 5, at 21. 
 56. Marian, supra note 55, at 3, 46. 
 57. European Commission Press Release IP/15/5780, Tax Transparency: Commission 
Welcomes Agreement Reached by Member States on the Automatic Exchange of Information on 
Tax Rulings (Oct. 6, 2015). Additionally, there have been bilateral agreements between certain 
states, such as that between Germany and the Netherlands. Teri Sprackland, Germany, Netherlands 
Agree to Share Tax Rulings, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 203, 203–04 (2015). 
 58. See, e.g., Stuart Gibson, Ending Abusive Tax Schemes—TAXE II Committee to the Rescue, 
82 TAX NOTES INT’L 721, 721 (2016). 
 59. Id. 
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C. Beneficial Ownership 
Another recent transparency and disclosure innovation emerged from the 
wake of a tax leak (here, the “Panama Papers” leak). In May of 2016, the ICIJ 
released a database containing 11.5 million records (covering forty years of data) 
from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca.60 Through the data, more than 
214,000 offshore entities were linked to individuals in over 200 countries and 
territories.61 Many of these links were otherwise unknown, and in some cases 
represented investment and ownership stakes that had not been declared by the 
owners as required by applicable domestic law.62 In some cases, the political 
reverberations from the leak were notable. Leaked documents revealed links 
between offshore entities and major political leaders including Chinese 
President Xi Jinping,63 U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron,64 Argentine 
President Mauricio Macri,65 and Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Davio 
Gunnlaugsson.66 Ultimately, the Icelandic Prime Minister resigned due to the 
scandal created by the leak’s disclosure of his undeclared offshore entity holding 
$4,000,000 in bonds.67  
In reaction to the Panama Papers leak, a number of countries (including 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland) 
have explored or have committed to registration requirements for beneficial 
ownership of offshore trusts and other entities.68 In April 2016, the G-5 
 
 60. OFFSHORE LEAKS DATABASE, HTTPS://OFFSHORELEAKS.ICIJ.ORG/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/4 
WED-7AWX]; Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and 
Corruption, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2016), https://panamapa 
pers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html [https://perma.cc/93DY-JZ2T]; see 
also Josh Meyer, Panama Papers: Database Released, Dozens of Americans Listed, NBC NEWS 
(May 10, 2016, 6:13 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/panama-papers/panama-papers-
database-released-dozens-americans-listed-n570771 [https://perma.cc/7U25-TB5B]. 
 61. Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 26; see also INT’L CONSORTIUM, supra note 60. 
 62. See Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 4 (“[The leaks] revealed the secret offshore financial 
holdings of high-net-worth individuals and the tax evasion and minimization practices of various 
taxpayers, financial institutions, and tax havens.”). 
 63. William Hoke & Stephanie Soong Johnston, Panama Papers Expose Thousands of 
Offshore Accounts, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 103, 103 (2016); see also INT’L CONSORTIUM, supra note 
60. 
 64. Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 26. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.; see also INT’L CONSORTIUM, supra note 60. 
 67. Steven Erlanger, Stephen Castle & Rick Gladstone, Iceland’s Prime Minister Steps Down 
Amid Panama Papers Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/ 
world/europe/panama-papers-iceland.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5268-QML8]; Oei & Ring, 
supra note 4, at 26. 
 68. Alexander Lewis, Independent Inquiry Urges Foreign Trust Disclosure Rules Update, 83 
TAX NOTES INT’L 34, 34–35 (2016); Alexander Lewis, U.K. Setting Up Panama Papers Task 
Force, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 249, 249 (2016); Stephanie Soong Johnston, More Countries Commit 
to Public Beneficial Ownership Registries, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 649, 649 (2016); Teri Sprackland, 
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announced to the G-2069 their commitment to establishing a global system for 
automatic exchange of beneficial ownership information.70 The European 
Commission already has taken action, adopting a plan for public disclosure of 
beneficial ownership registries.71 
D. Extractive Industries and Beyond 
Global transparency and disclosure steps with links to taxation have also 
been taken in arenas formally outside of tax. For example, U.S. securities law 
requires businesses engaged in extractive industries (e.g., exploration, 
extraction, processing and export of oil, natural gas or minerals) to report certain 
payments made to foreign governments.72 Covered payments include “taxes, 
royalties, fees (including license fees), production entitlements, bonuses, and 
other material benefits.”73 Although the SEC adopted final rules effective 
September 201674 implementing the statutory mandate, the Senate’s February 3, 
2017 resolution under the Congressional Review Act disapproved the final rules 
and rendered them effectively nonexistent.75 The statutory mandate remains in 
place, though, leading to uncertainty as to its planned enforcement.  
At a global level, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”) 
advances a two-sided approach for reporting in the extractive industries sector.76 
Businesses would report their payments to each jurisdiction, and the 
governments would then report the payments that they received, effectively 
providing both clarity and a check on inaccurate reporting by either side.77 
 
German Transparency Registry Proposal Derided as ‘Joke,’ 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 154, 154 (2016); 
Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 28. 
 69. HM Treasury & The Rt Hon George Osborne, G5 Letter to G20 Counterparts Regarding 
Action on Beneficial Ownership, GOV’T U.K. (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
publications/g5-letter-to-g20-counterparts-regarding-action-on-beneficial-ownership [https://per 
ma.cc/G6AS-BRF9]. 
 70. Ryan Finley, EU Countries Announce Beneficial Ownership Exchange Plan, 82 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 238, 238 (2016). 
 71. Alexander Lewis, EU Adopts Public Registries of Beneficial Ownership Information, 83 
TAX NOTES INT’L 100, 100 (2016). 
 72. Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 2, at 525, 552. 
 73. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(C)(ii) (2012). 
 74. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,359 (July 27, 
2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b). 
 75. Eric Lipton, G.O.P. Hurries to Slash Oil and Gas Rules, Ending Industries’ 8-Year Wait, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/politics/republicans-oil-gas-
regulations.html [https://perma.cc/VY7S-S2KT]. 
 76. EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, EITI FACTSHEET 1–2 (2014), http://eiti. 
org/sites/default/files/documents/2014-07-03_Factsheet_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L8U-48 
G4]. 
 77. Id.; see Table of EITI Countries, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, 
http://eiti.org/countries [https://perma.cc/23RR-AXP2] (EITI countries and country reports 
available). 
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Reaching beyond extractive industries, the EU has sought to introduce basic 
country-by-country reporting within the financial services sector.78 A 2013 
Directive calls for covered financial institutions to report the following 
information on a country-by-country basis: profit (loss) before tax, tax paid, 
subsidies received, and average number of employees.79 Implementation is 
required at the member-state level through enactment of domestic rules requiring 
this financial institution reporting.80 
E. Public Disclosure 
Finally, it is worth noting a trend within a trend: advocacy for public 
disclosure and not simply disclosure to the government in the context of various 
transparency and disclosure mechanisms.81 The move reflects a desire to guard 
against several risks including corruption, enforcement bias, collusion, and 
limited government resources. Thus, for example, the EITI Standard “requires 
EITI Reports that are ‘comprehensible, actively promoted, publicly accessible, 
and contribute to public debate’ (EITI Requirement 7.1).”82 Relatedly, the EITI 
reports on links between a country’s participation in the EITI project and 
declining corruption.83  
With respect to beneficial ownership, a public registry is already part of the 
EU platform, and some countries have undertaken the necessary legal reform.84 
In the context of BEPS Action 13 CbC reporting, the possibility of public 
disclosure of some or all of a multinational’s report has been the subject of much 
 
 78. Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 2, at 552. 
 79. Directive 2013/36 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the 
Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions 
and Investment Firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 384–85. 
 80. See, e.g., The Capital Requirements (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2013, 
SI 2013/3118, art. 1, 2 (Eng.) (reporting rules in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland came into effect in January 2014, with the first reporting required by 1 July 2014.); see also 
HM Treasury, Capital Requirements (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2013: 
Guidance, GOV’T U.K. (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/capital-re 
quirements-country-by-country-reporting-regulations-2013-guidance/capital-requirements-coun 
try-by-country-reporting-regulations-2013-guidance [https://perma.cc/GNR8-AUM5]. 
 81. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 23. 
 82. Open EITI Data, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/ex 
plore-data-portal [https://perma.cc/CZ7H-RYD6]. 
 83. Elissaios Papyrakis, Matthias Rieger & Emma Gilberthorpe, Corruption and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 53 J. DEV. STUD. 295, 295–309 (2017) (citing 
specific research linking participation in the EITI project by mineral-rich jurisdictions to a positive 
effect on corruption). 
 84. See, e.g., COMPANIES HOUSE AND DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY, & INDUS. STRATEGY, 
GOV’T U.K., SUMMARY GUIDE FOR COMPANIES – REGISTER OF PEOPLE WITH SIGNIFICANT 
CONTROL 1 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 
file/555657/PSC_register_summary_guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/72N3-4ZMN]. 
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debate. Although the OECD has explicitly stated that the reports should be kept 
confidential,85 public awareness of multinational tax planning and the potential 
for base erosion has prompted calls for public disclosure of the CbC reports.86 
Some jurisdictions have already taken steps toward public disclosure;87 
however, the ultimate outcome remains uncertain. The more salient point for 
purposes of this Essay is the degree to which the trend for transparency and 
disclosure has included a related, though not wholly embraced nor executed, 
push for public transparency and disclosure. 
III.  THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INCREASED BORDER FLEXIBILITY OF 
BUSINESS AND THE NEW FOCUS ON TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE 
While neither global business activity nor disclosure requirements in 
international tax are new, both have experienced a surge in recent years, as 
detailed above.88 Part III argues that this confluence is not a coincidence and 
that we might best understand the new transparency and disclosure trend as the 
natural consequence—or price—of business migration. Against the baseline 
pressure for information created by business migration, the episodic forces of 
 
 85. OECD, supra note 43, at 20–21. 
 86. See, e.g., CIVIL SOC’Y 20 [C20], C20 POSITION PAPER: GOVERNANCE (2014), https://star. 
worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/c20_governance_position_paper_australia_june_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NFG7-7L5N] (urging a commitment to make country-by-country reporting 
public thereby “ensuring that poorer countries can easily access this information to address BEPS 
in their contexts”); Christian Aid, Christian Aid Submission, in 1 OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON 
TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND CBC REPORTING (2014), https://www.oecd.org/ 
ctp/transfer-pricing/volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MKM3-LJQS] (articulating its “belief that the 
Country by Country (CbC) report be made public” in order to hold both governments and taxpayers 
more accountable through such tax information); Trade Union Advisory Comm. to the OECD, 
OECD Public Consultation on Draft Revised Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and 
Country-by-Country Reporting: Comments by the TUAC, in 4 OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON 
TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND CBC REPORTING (2014), http://www.oecd.org/cup/ 
transferpricing/volume4.pdf [https://perma.cc/D23H-JJ8Y] (supporting public disclosure on the 
grounds that it would be helpful for developing countries to access the information and “would also 
help inform other stakeholders, who are affected by the activities and operations of MNEs, 
including workers, local communities, civil society groups and of course citizens at large”). 
 87. See Andrew Goodall, U.K. Ministers Reject MPs’ Call to Action on Transparency, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Jan. 19, 2017, LEXIS, 2017 WTD 13-3. In 2016, the U.K. government 
was granted statutory authority to require multinationals to publish CbC reports with data on profits 
and taxes. Id. However, there has been subsequent debate regarding whether and how the 
government should exercise this new-found power. Id.; EU Council Reviews Status of Income Tax 
Information Disclosure Proposal, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 19, 2016, LEXIS, 2016 WTD 
244-21. The EU has been considering an income tax disclosure proposal. EU Council, supra note 
87. At the end of 2016, the French Constitutional Council determined that public CbC reporting 
would not be constitutional in France. Alexander Lewis, French Constitutional Council Finds 
Public CbC Reporting Unconstitutional, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 9, 2016, LEXIS, 2016 
WTD 238-7. 
 88. See supra Part I. 
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tax leaks have forged the unique design and timing of specific transparency and 
disclosure regimes.  
A. The Link 
One way to appreciate the connection between increased border flexibility 
and transparency and disclosure is to consider what a tax authority loses when 
business activity moves offshore: (1) close proximity to information, and (2) the 
ability to control key sources of abuse. The first point may be more obvious—
to the extent a taxpayer and all of its activities are based in one jurisdiction, the 
domestic tax authorities have greater ability to secure needed information, 
whether from the taxpayer, from third parties, or from direct observation. 
Information, of course, can be difficult to secure even in a wholly domestic 
context and may require formal reporting requirements and legal interventions 
(such as warrants). However, to the extent the entire process occurs within the 
confines of a single jurisdiction, the tax authority is physically closer to 
information, has only domestic law constraints on information gathering, and is 
unimpeded by language barriers. All of these factors pose a greater challenge to 
tax enforcement when business taxpayers begin to cross borders.  
The second point, regarding the ability to control key sources of abuse, may 
be less obvious at first but is powerful. One significant way in which taxpayers 
may aggressively (but legally) engage in tax planning—or alternatively cross the 
line into tax abuse—is through reliance on gaps and conflicts in existing law. 
Historically, there are numerous examples in U.S. tax law of “opportunities” that 
emerged in the domestic law to create advantages for taxpayers that were not 
intended by Congress.89 As noted, in some cases the advantages may have been 
entirely legal, but once apparent to Congress and tax authorities, were removed 
from the law (e.g., the interaction between the investment tax credit and 
accelerated depreciation in 1981 that was reversed in 1982).90 Other 
“advantages” may be considered entirely inappropriate by the tax authorities, 
but once identified, can be tackled through a combination of audit, legal 
clarification, or additional reporting requirements (e.g., listed transactions 
 
 89. For example, in the corporate tax context, the interplay between the dividends received 
deduction under I.R.C. § 243 and deduction losses by corporate shareholders on the sale of stock 
created an arbitrage opportunity. This was ultimately addressed through changes in the law 
including the addition of I.R.C. §§ 246, 1059. See, e.g., TAX SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
REPORT ON REGULATIONS TO BE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 246(C) RESTRICTING THE DIVIDENDS 
RECEIVED DEDUCTION 1–6 (Report #750, 1993), https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_ 
Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_1993/Tax_Section_Report_750.html [https://perma.cc/KGB2-BN 
MZ]. 
 90. See, e.g., Stephen A. Meyer, Tax Policy Effects on Investment: The 1981 and 1982 Tax 
Acts, BUS. REV., Nov./Dec. 1984, at 3, 6. 
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rules).91 However, all of these options are more realistic precisely because the 
domestic tax authority can eventually see all of the moving parts—the various 
rules on which the taxpayer is building its reporting position—because they are 
contained within one system.  
Once some of the transactions, assets, and business activities migrate 
offshore, a key source of planning includes arbitrage between and among the 
domestic tax system and that of one or more other jurisdictions. In such cases, 
the domestic tax authorities may not be aware of the foreign tax rules at play (or 
may not know how they are being applied in specific taxpayer cases) and may 
not be able to identify the resulting tax arbitrage. The opportunity for domestic 
tax authorities to respond to abuse becomes less likely and more attenuated when 
the arbitrage is conducted with foreign law. Although this argument could be 
framed as an informational one (i.e., point one above), it may be more useful to 
identify it as a separate concern. The problem does not concern difficulty 
securing access to information about the taxpayer’s activities, assets, and income 
simply because they are less proximate. Rather, the problem is that a key to tax 
planning and abuse is arbitrage and inconsistency outside the domestic regime. 
Better information about this foreign law problem allows a jurisdiction to 
consider options including domestic law reform, application of economic 
substance or similar regimes to the taxpayer’s transaction, or negotiation with 
another country. Moreover, interest in the potential abuse in cross-border tax 
planning extends beyond domestic tax authorities to domestic civil society. 
Some members of the public, as well as nongovernmental organizations and 
news agencies, have the capacity to evaluate these issues but, similarly, may 
struggle to the extent taxpayer planning involves otherwise less obvious 
interactions between domestic and foreign tax law. 
With these two observations about the genesis of problems facing domestic 
tax authorities in international transactions, we can appreciate how the new 
trends in transparency and disclosure respond to these underlying and inherent 
limitations. For example, CbC reporting would automatically require 
multinationals to provide a quick and more complete (and potentially uniform) 
overview of their global operations, including data about assets, activities, and 
transactions outside the ready reach of domestic tax authorities. Exchange of tax 
rulings offers a quick window into the arbitrage potential and the intersection of 
domestic law with “guaranteed” foreign tax treatment. Using such information, 
tax authorities can more completely assess taxpayers’ reporting positions and 
even identify potential domestic substantive law reforms that may be warranted 
in light of potential arbitrage. 
 
 91. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, at 35 
(Joint Comm. Print 1982). 
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B. The Implications 
As outlined above in Section I.B, corporations have pursued a variety of 
migration options. They have used the increased border flexibility created by 
changes in law (currency, capital controls, foreign direct investment (“FDI”), 
and trade) along with advances in information technology and communications 
to engage in a genuine re-design and/or expansion of their underlying 
commercial enterprise.92 Additionally, however, some businesses have used the 
same changes to pursue paper migrations across borders that are less substantive. 
In both cases, when information, assets, and activity are offshore, they pose the 
information constraints outlined above. 
Seen through this lens, tax authorities’ need for new and different 
information is not an outgrowth (desirable or not) of efforts such as the OECD 
BEPS project. Instead, the fundamental catalyst of the transparency and 
disclosure trend is business migration. This primary force is then complemented 
by the secondary effects of convulsive events such as tax leaks that dictate the 
distinct terms and timing of the reforms. 
Awareness of the elemental motivations for and pressures compelling the 
new transparency and disclosure regimes may also help frame and explain the 
continual contemplation of public disclosure of multinational tax data. Calls for 
such disclosure appear across of range of data categories (e.g., CbC reports, 
beneficial ownership registries, disclosure of tax, and related subsidies). 
Although the details of what is sought and how public it should be do differ, the 
root problem is business migration across borders. This is the new normal in 
business, and it may ultimately create a new normal—at least for some players—
in corresponding tax compliance commitments through transparency and 
disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
Just as the migration of individuals presents a host of new issues for tax 
systems, the migration of businesses from the 1980s onward introduced new 
enforcement and information challenges for tax authorities. With the reduction 
in currency, capital, trade, and FDI restrictions that gained traction in the 1980s, 
and the simultaneous rise of information technology and communication 
capacity, multinationals found a new ability to move across borders. Although 
such movement was certainly not new, the scope and volume of such migration 
represented a sea of change.  
Tax administrations witnessed the impact of this change on their ability to 
gain a clear picture of MNEs’ global operations. Ultimately, countries 
introduced multiple mechanisms, including both direct disclosure and third-
party reporting, to fill the gaps in their knowledge of taxpayer income, activities, 
 
 92. See supra Section 1.B. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
192 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:175 
transactions, and opportunities for arbitrage. This resulting transparency and 
disclosure revolution, with its roots firmly in the reality of corporate migration, 
is unlikely to fade even though its precise formulations remain subject to the 
continuing forces of tax leaks, international relations, and domestic politics. 
 
